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**POWER IN THE CONTEXT OF SOCIAL-CULTURAL DYNAMICS OF SOCIETY:
HISTORICAL AND SOCIOLOGICAL ANALYSIS**

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Objective: to consider the institution of power in different historical periods of social development – from the establishment of Lenin's ideology to the present.

Methodology: The basis of the research is the methodology proposed by F. Braudel concerning the synthetic approach to the definition of the essence of cultural-civilizational processes through systematic analysis of social, economic, historical, political etc. components. This allows defining more deeply the dynamics, principles, factors, transformations of cultural features of the development of society in its civilizational values.

The scientific novelty of this study is in the considerable attention paid to the analysis of the market model of contemporary Ukrainian society in the context of the establishment and functioning of democratic values.

Conclusions: Analyzing power in the context of socio-cultural dynamics of society it can be noted: the history of the twentieth century recognized the existence of various models of development of society. The market model of society's development implies the presence of a multi-faceted economy; market regulators with preservation of planned microproportions; openness to world economic influences, involvement in the international division of labor; the creation of a rule of law and civil society. Ukraine represents a whole spectrum of diverse interests of groups and strata, related to their current situation and future movement in the social hierarchy. The state of mass consciousness of Ukrainian society is characterized by ideological and political diversity, of which the main tendencies are democratic and authoritarian. Most of the Ukrainian population is still subjected to stereotypes that do not let the economic potential of free society to develop freely. The future of economic culture depends not only on changes in the minds and behavior of people, but also on institutional conditions. The most promising policy in this socio-economic situation should be modernization based on economic initiative.

Key words: society, power, democracy, market, dynamics, values, culture.

The exceptional complexity of the problems faced by modern Ukrainian society requires a qualitative shift in the study of the mechanisms of their occurrence and ways of resolving them, a deeper penetration into the laws of the dynamics of national history. Complex synthetic theories of hierarchical nature are needed, that is, those that cover both micro-and macro-evolution, both the philosophy of history and the study of particular historical process.

General philosophical stratum is necessary, since it should reveal a certain methodological basis for the explanation and understanding of social processes. The ability of the subject to ideally and materially overcome the socio-cultural contradictions of their own activities, which constantly arise between social relations and culture, becomes more important. Very important stratum of the research should be the philosophy of history, which reveals the general laws of the dynamics of the historical process. The third stratum is an analysis of a specific historical process, or rather, an attempt to logically recreate specific historical process based on a kind of dialogue, interpenetration and co-criticism of the logic of the historical process and empirical historical material.

Synthesis of the achievements of culturology, sociology, systemic research, analysis of modern processes in the world (e.g., modernization) is needed. This will allow you to answer both the “old” and the “new” questions, which arise in connection with the diverse and varied processes and phenomena of the beginning of the XXI century.

New results can be obtained by improving the methodology. To analyze the dynamics of society it is expedient to use the achievements of the reproductive approach, the idea of the existence of two basic types of reproduction: static and intense, as well as destructive. Traditional civilization is characterized by the domination of static reproduction, that is, aimed at maintaining the society, the whole system of communities, each of them; culture, social relations, personality, in accordance with certain ideas that idealize the past. It is considered as ideal, unchanged, even if it changes.

In liberal civilization, the prevailing position is intensive reproduction, which is characterized by the desire to reproduce society, culture, constantly deepening its content, increasing its social efficiency, livelihoods. For example, in its historical development, Russia went beyond the traditional civilization, and took the path to mass (albeit primitive) utilitarianism. However, it has somehow managed to overcome the limit of liberal civilization. This means that Russia occupies an intermediate position between the two civilizations. This makes it possible to speak of the existence of a special, “intermediate” civilization, which combines elements of social relations and the culture of both civilizations [17, p. 153].

The dynamics of a country, which is in between of the two types of civilization, acquired in the process of self-complication of a society of conflict, self-destructive nature. And for the analysis of this problem, one can use the achievements of structuralism interpreted dynamically. It is necessary for the development of a mechanism for the dynamics of culture and social relations. The motions of Russia between the two main types of civilization has become a conflict, inorganic character, which is clearly embodied in such a complex phenomenon, which can be called split [6, p. 101]. This concept, both explicitly and latent, was an important content element of Russian nationalists. Split is a pathological state of society, characterized by a contradiction between culture and social relations, between subcultures of one culture. In the West, more favorable relations between culture and forms of social interactions have developed.

Actually, the split of power arises when society cannot overcome the contradictions between culture and social relations and makes an attempt to adapt to this contradiction. It can be stated that the “mature” split arose during the times of Petr I. In a split society, the society constantly balances on the verge of irreversible disorganization. Characteristic of the split is

the “vicious circle”, that is, the activation of positive values in one part of the split society gives rise to the force in another part of this society, which denies these values.

Activation of the values of progress and development, the desire to go through modernization can intensify the static traditionalist values of a certain part of the population. At the same time, activation of values of traditionalism pushes part of society into enlightenment, struggle for progress. In other words, the desire of each of the divided parts of society generates a double effect of the boomerang. That is, the mutual desire of these parts to act in opposite directions (against each other) paralyzes and disorganizes them.

An important feature of the “old” (pre-soviet) period is the new methods of adapting to the split. By contrasting itself with the past as an uncomfortable state, society perceived itself as the exactly opposite of its history. It tended to its beginning, to syncretism with its state notions. The paradox of a new society, the deep contradiction in its identity, the content of the prevailing levels of culture and the real content of a new society that has long since deviated from syncretism has already appeared here. However, syncretism has remained at the level of values, massive aspirations to create a society – a community – on the basis of everyday relationships. There was a need for a word capable of persuading everyone not only in the possibilities, but also in the need for this attempt. This forced the old society to form a special ideology, which can be called pseudosyncretism.

Lenin created the official ideology of a new society, relying on the actual organization of anti-crime, anti-authoritarian type. This initial mythological form of a new society is the opposite of the initial self-reflection of the past. On the basis of empirical recognition and metaphysical denial of existing differences, a special “Leninist” model of society arose. It consisted of three elements: the bourgeoisie, the petty bourgeoisie (which is basically peasantry) and the proletariat. This model was of a purely Manichean nature, since the bourgeoisie and the proletariat were viewed as extremes that have no ambivalence, interpenetration [2, p. 367].

This mythological model, though published as a result of “Scientific Communism”, did not correspond to the accumulated information about Russia according to any criterion. The main struggle in this country was not carried out between the workers and the bourgeoisie, but between the peasantry (which starting with the discovery of the “insolvency” of extreme authoritarianism, fought for its release from the pressure of the state) and the patrimonial power. The peasantry was not inclined to deepen commodity-money relations beyond a certain limited level, turning them into dominant in society. This Leninist model was internally tense. Its pathos consisted in achieving syncretism, that is, the fusion of all differences in society, in addition to the carriers of evil, in a single sacred point.

Lenin’s ideology was sacred. For example, peasants’ mass beliefs were used not only as a subject of influence, but also as a mean of ensuring the ideals of syncretism, strengthening integration. Peasant beliefs were perceived not from the side of their importance, but from the side of the possibility of using them for external purposes. Any position that did not coincide with the point of view of the sacral center, either was destroyed by force, or perceived as an own one, in order to persuade its carriers to merge in indissoluble syncretism. For example, Lenin was constantly approaching the values of the peasantry, using the “windship effect”, relying on peasants to solve problems that could not receive support in the direct form [2, p. 370].

The internal tragedy of the Leninist model (which turned into utopian) was that there were no forces in the country capable of “pulling” the entire society into the sacred point of the higher Truth. At the same time, one should not forget that the influence of the Bolsheviks in the countryside was significant. Stalin’s attempt to radically increase this influence has led to numerous casualties and could not “pull” a culture out of what was commonly

called “primitive agriculture”. And the causes of this backwardness of agriculture rooted in the depths of Russian history.

An important feature of the new system was that it was an inverse-type reaction to the dualism of the old system. The society sought to combine, on the one hand, the state monopoly on economic activity (based on pre-economic traditionalism), on the other hand – the development of private initiative, commodity-money relations, and later capitalist relations. The bourgeoisie developed spontaneously, that is, sought to work on the market. Being relatively independent, however, it was limited by power. Its activities were not so much an enterprise of bourgeois type as parasitism on the external forms of the capitalist industrial-financial mechanism. The average entrepreneurial stratum was weak and insignificant. Some more advanced business elements “drowned” in the traditional merchant environment with its low culture, the lack of elementary business ethics.

At the same time, it should be noted that before the World War I there was a certain rise of private entrepreneurship. Capitalist Russia, oriented toward the West, coexisted with another feudal and semi-commodity Russia. The latter with its natural-historical self-development was still far from any capitalization and bourgeois. New society and new ideology sought to overcome this duality, to reduce everything to an archaic manifestation of the original dual opposition. The fact that this program corresponded to the values of the majority of the population did not make it less utopian. If at first it was imagined that the destructive force of the socio-cultural conflict was the bearer of a private initiative, then gradually it became clear that traditionalism was an active force. It could exist under the rule of archaic statehood, but ultimately it existed with growing private initiative, state that has embarked on the path of modernization, liberal reforms and betrayed traditionalism.

Bolshevik state, relying on the intensification of mass traditionalism, originated as an attempt to overcome this conflict by suppressing the private initiative and returning to the traditional state monopoly of economic activity. This was possible, because society had extremely weak “intermediate” forces (artisans, mass production). They were oppressed by large-scale production, which was receiving state support, or was directly “merging” with the state. The widespread interpretation was that socialism is nothing more than a state monopoly, aimed at the benefit of the entire nation [1, p. 54].

V. Lenin went not from capitalism to a post-capitalist society, but from the unexpected, controversial subjugation of the state’s life to its consistent conquest. He advanced this idea, striving to justify the syncretisation of the essence of the merger of the economy and the state (as well as ideology), dictatorship and democracy, and the “pulling” into the state of all independent functions. A new society arose as an attempt to return to socio-historical origins. But complicated by the desire for modernization and splits it entered again the new modified inversion cycle on an accelerated scale.

The irony of the fate lies in the fact that, starting from the collegiality, Soviet society turned into terrible authoritarianism, mass genocide, because it could not find other ways to integrate. The collapse and discreditation of extreme authoritarianism stimulated the transformation of direct inversion into inverse. That is, the movement to dissolution in the totem – the father – the leader was replaced with pursuance of the desire for a totem of the local world. Powerful vibrational movement began in the opposite direction, to the collapse of statehood, the triumph of localism.

Mass transition from extreme authoritarianism (totalitarianism) to its polarity (which became a reaction to the non-functionality of authoritarianism) came close to the extreme forms of the cathedral ideal, which was reflected in the growth of localism. At the same time, under localism, one should understand the special situation in the “big” society, which arises

in the conditions of the weakness of cultural integrators. It stimulates attempts to compensate for cultural weakness by administrative mechanisms. Such a society is atomized, divided into self-sufficient, closed communities that are opposed to the surrounding social environment. These communities are inclined to develop their attitude towards it on the basis of a monopoly on the deficit, which causes the collapse of economic ties that operated under administrative pressure. The growth of the deficit leads to a massive transformation of society into discomfort, to the threat of social upheaval, the departure of the ruling version of the moral ideal [4, с. 112–113].

Localism finds its embodiment in a variety of processes, the main of which is the growing separation that arises in the collapse of extreme authoritarianism. This wave of localism moves to its extreme logical point, that is, to the maximum collapse of communities and the loss of ties between them. This process takes place in conjunction with the privatization of interests. The power and deficit monopoly shifted from the center to departments, regions, oblasts and so on. An important feature of localism is that the relations of local worlds with a “big” society become split. That is, towards large society and one another the local worlds become the centers of the formation of mafia clans, corruption as a means of penetration into the socio-cultural environment that surrounds us.

However, localism cannot be confused with decentralization, which is associated with the weakening of the possibility of administrative intervention in making decisions at higher levels relative to the lower ones. Decentralization is possible as a weakening of administrative integrators with a corresponding strengthening of cultural ones. Localism should not be confused with decentralization, which can only exist as one that involves the increase of responsibility of the individual, local communities on the basis of awareness of the rule of law. Finally, localism cannot be confused with the isolation of those nations, territorial communities, which were united in a violent way.

The mass movement towards localism at all levels (during the so-called “perestroika”) merged into a single stream with the liberation movement of former USSR people. This, in the end, led to the complete elimination of the central union power, to the constant reduction of its supporters. In those times the only thing uniting the “left” and “right” was the critique of Mikhail Gorbachev with his permanent attempts to find its resistance in the center. However, both the “left” and the “right” were in agreement with the massive traditional hostility of the people in relation to the authorities as well as the traditions of the past. This process of degeneration of the center in the face of advancing localism could lead to only one – the further weakening of the central government and its collapse, even from a small impetus. The events of August 19–21, 1991, which received the inadequate name of the coup, were equal to the October Revolution of 1917.

At the end of the “perestroika”, people became disillusioned with its ideas and started to hate “bosses” who cared only about themselves. Mikhail Gorbachev, as the first person, lost his sacred significance to society, indicating a serious threat to the central government and the state as a whole. Although it should be noted that the “father of perestroika” came to the leadership of the state of multinational (albeit during the difficult time), socially stable, where the rusty economic mechanism still was providing a subsistence minimum for the people, all supported its culture and education.

One of the peculiarities of the process of disappointing the population in the “restructuring” was the desire for strong power. It was on these sentiments that the supporters of the establishment of authoritarian power sought to rely. However, this was not enough to win authoritarianism. And during the August “coup” Boris Yeltsin (as the charismatic leader of Russia) unmistakably determined for himself an uncompromising stance on “bosses” and became a national hero. However, Yeltsin’s victory, as well as any victory of the charismatic leader, lent latent dangers.

In general, they were the same as those who stood before Mikhail Gorbachev. The first person must constantly hold in the rank of the totem, that is to act and speak in the way that certain part of the society, on which the reproductive activity and the fate of power depends [17, c. 172].

Right before the collapse of the Soviet Union, similar problems arose on the territory of Ukraine. When the Movement came out on the political field, only Leonid Kravchuk, who was entrusted with the dialogue in the most difficult televised debates with strong opponents, was ready to open discussions with his representatives (enough to mention the famous philosopher Myroslav Popovich). It was then that L. Kravchuk was forming as a politician, known throughout the country. He taking over a key position in the then government was, perhaps, a historic chance for Ukraine.

Understanding the responsibility before his people, L. Kravchuk went up to the level of urgent tasks that needed to be resolved both intellectually and politically. It was then that one of the most important (and most mysterious) shifts in history happened – the collapse of the USSR and the CPSU. At that time it was rather consistent position of L. Kravchuk's (the interests of Ukraine above all) helped him to stay on the crest of the revolution, when the "lower classes" did not want to live in the old way, and the "upper classes" were unable to rule in a new way. In ten days that shocked Ukraine, L. Kravchuk as a true politician underwent the way from the first statement in the media to the Decree on independence and the logical conclusion – the suspension of activity, and then the prohibition of the Communist Party of Ukraine. The referendum on December 1, 1991 gave him a political and moral card-blanc, which he brilliantly took as an advantage. L. Kravchuk already fully mastered the situation and knew what, when and how should be done in the future.

Then there were presidential elections, the rupture of a single national economic complex of the former USSR, catastrophic inflation. Later on, we saw "riots" of the adversaries and the strikes of miners. But from the standpoint of the present it seems secondary, insignificant events.

In this difficult situation, L. Kravchuk goes to an early democratic presidential election, although all real power was in his hands. And he would not be the first nation-elected President if he had not demonstrated an honest, legal transfer of power. He was again at his best of the current historical moment, showing the descendants that the moral imperative for politics is the main thing.

Leonid Kuchma became the President of Ukraine in 1994. Evaluating the period of his reign (1994–2004) it can be noted that he showed himself as a brilliant tactician and worthless strategist. During the reign of L. Kuchma, society has changed in the direction of social differentiation. As a result of the "liberal" reforms, "ordinary Ukrainians" not only did not receive their share of state property, but also became less socially protected (compared with Soviet times). During the so-called "reforms", the national wealth of the country was in the hands of a number of clans, whose representatives managed not only to increase their capital, but also to worsen the living conditions of the majority of the population of Ukraine. It is the strengthening of the economic and political status of these clans that has become the main achievement of this power.

During L. Kuchma's presidency, national, mostly comprador capital is formed, primarily as a result of predatory privatization. Like mushrooms after the rain grow corrupt officials. Initial accumulation, with its cynicism and criminal methods, acquired unprecedented scope. In public speeches L. Kuchma is all allegedly correct. A course on the investment (innovation) model of development is proclaimed, but nothing really is being done. Significant projects included the Odessa-Brody pipeline, the Kyiv-Odessa motorway, the Danube-Black Sea channel, which in fact turned out to be bluff [5, p. 45].

The third President of Ukraine, Viktor Yushchenko (2005–2010), who took over this position after the Orange Revolution, has shown himself as a patriotic, “pro-Western” person. At one time, he successfully and efficiently managed the National Bank and the Cabinet of Ministers. As the history showed, two weeks after taking the oath of the President of Ukraine, Viktor Yushchenko made the first (irrevocable) mistake, nominating Yulia Tymoshenko as Prime Minister. This appointment was forced, under the “pressure” of the Maidan. Although the President himself wanted to see P. Poroshenko (who was appointed as the secretary of the National Security and Defense Council) in this post. Therefore, in fact, the entire presidential term of V. Yushchenko was marked by the struggle against Yulia Tymoshenko, in whose activity two trends dominated: social populism and preparation for the presidential laurels. Subsequently, the President “fell into the same trap”, re-appointing Yulia Tymoshenko as Prime Minister.

V. Yushchenko’s presidency was remembered for inconsistency, the adoption of unexploited, groundless decisions, political contradictions and wars (including corruption) in the camp of “dear friends”. The “western” direction of the President’s activity was more effective. We are talking about the efforts aimed at joining the WTO, NATO and the European Union. The logical conclusion of V. Yushchenko’s presidential career was a defeat at the 2010 elections (5th place with 5.45% of the votes) [5, p. 102].

Viktor Yanukovich, the leader of the Party of Regions, won the victory in the 2010 presidential election (in a tough fight with Yulia Tymoshenko). At that time, he was a well-known figure not only in the Donetsk region, but also in the political field as a whole, occupying the position of the Prime Minister. In addition, we have note one “interesting” feature of Yulia Tymoshenko. There were no doubts that Yulia Volodymyrivna is eager to gain the power (like most politicians). But this is not the main feature of Yulia’s “political” figure. She wants to gain not just power, she wants “fame”, she wants to be remembered as a “President”.

Viktor Yanukovich continued the glorious “achievements” of Leonid Kuchma on “improving” the clan system of government in Ukrainian society. Almost all key positions in the Ukrainian authorities under Yanukovich were occupied by Donetsk representatives. All the “minor” positions (remaining after “Donetsk clan”) Viktor Yanukovich “gives” to the representatives of Lugansk region. At the same time, it is quite noteworthy that Yanukovich’s eldest son (nickname “Sasha-dentist”) was “managing” the power structures.

Without any doubt, Viktor Yanukovich consistently pursued a pro-Russian policy, constantly being in contact with D. Medvedev (at that time, the President of the Russian Federation) and V. Putin (the Prime Minister). The result of these contacts was an agreement on the conditions for deepening economic, political and socio-cultural cooperation between Ukraine and Russia. First of all, it is a question of an Agreement between Russia and Ukraine on the issues of the Russian Black Sea Fleet presence on the territory of Ukraine (the location of the Russian fleet on Ukrainian territory after 2017 was prolonged for another 25 years). Accordingly, documents were signed on reducing the price of Russian gas by 30%, as well as the construction of a bridge across the Kerch Strait, the completion of which was planned for 2014. Ironically, this year, Russia has committed aggression against Ukraine, annexing the Crimean peninsula.

During the “Revolution of Dignity” in 2014, Viktor Yanukovich fled to Russian Federation, where he occasionally proclaims his “Rostov speeches” openly directed against the Ukrainian state, Ukrainian society and the Ukrainian people.

In the spring of 2014 (at the beginning of the military conflict in the Donbass) in the first round, Petro Poroshenko was elected the President of Ukraine. At this time, Petro Alekseevich was a well-known figure in the business and political circles of Ukrainian society. Under Viktor

Yushchenko, he served as the Secretary of the National Security and Defense Council, and was later Minister of Economy and Minister of Foreign Affairs.

The greatest achievements of P. Poroshenko on the post of the President of Ukraine are connected with foreign policy activities. Thus, an agreement on association with the European Union was signed and Ukraine got visa-free regime. Also P. Poroshenko should be noted as the commander-in-chief of the Armed Forces of Ukraine. To a large extent, thanks to his efforts, Ukraine now has a capable army, which gives a decent rebuff to Russian aggression. After all, current situation is considered by citizens as a struggle with an external enemy (Russia). Such opinion was mentioned by 37.7% of respondents (according to sociological monitoring of the Institute of Sociology of the National Academy of Sciences of Ukraine 2017). At the same time, 34.3% of citizens believe that there is a struggle between the oligarchs and 26.4% stated that the struggle of foreign policy players in Ukraine.

Much modest is the success of the current government inside the country. The deterioration of the economic situation, the decline in the material well-being of the population (also due to the situation in the Donbass) affected the assessment of the activities of the President of Ukraine. Thus, according to sociological monitoring, while accessing the performance of P. Poroshenko as the President only 1.7% of Ukrainian citizens estimated it as highly effective, while 33.3% indicated his incompetence. At the same time, 43.1% of respondents do not trust the President at all. It should be also noted that the level of distrust in the Verkhovna Rada and the Cabinet of Ministers is even more significant. Accordingly, 50.3% and 48.0% of Ukrainian citizens do not trust these institutions.

Analyzing power in the context of socio-cultural dynamics of society (both Soviet and modern Ukrainian) one can state: the history of the twentieth century has shown that recognition of the multivariable process also means recognition of different models of social development. At the heart of the latter - not only the diversity of economic, political and socio-cultural prerequisites in individual countries, but also the understanding of historical subjects of goals, content and functions of the corresponding system. His models have variations within a range of alternatives: economic, commodity, market, democratic or administrative-command.

The market model of society's development implies the presence of a multi-faceted economy; market regulators with preservation of planned microproportions; openness to world economic influences and involvement in the international division of labor; the creation of a rule-of-law and civil society with a multitude of interests; spiritual freedom.

Ukraine's coming out of economical, political and socio-cultural recession, which is, in essence, permanent, should be considered as a transition to a market economy system, where a multi-faceted economy forms the basis of civil society. The market path is connected to the Ukrainian society with radical changes in the system of economic relations, with such transformations in the economic sphere, which will create a strong motivation of labor. It is now clear that the success of market transformations depends crucially on the willingness and ability of people to realize their economic interests, to engage in the process of socio-political, socio-economic, and socio-cultural transformations, without interacting with indescribable contradictions.

Today's theoretical view is focused on a single sacramental question: the lack of obvious success in society's reform is the result of initially incorrectly chosen course or the consequence when the correct reforms are not brought to a logical conclusion? We can say that the consideration of plans for market reforms in Ukraine, due to the prism of their coordination with the logic of a particular economic field (economic school), is not important for the modern period of Ukrainian independence. Here it is more important to understand the initiated processes. It should be realized with all responsibility that political, economic and socio-cultural reforms

throughout the period of Ukrainian democratization did not become the focus of reformist politicians, their priorities were not determined by the logic of the socio-economic and socio-cultural process.

Consequently, those who go beyond the scope of the positivist interpretation of the “Democrats”, as well as the economic doctrine of the transformation of Soviet society, should be included in the scope of research problems. The development of the normative image of the future society was and remains an integral part of any serious reform in the socio-economic and socio-cultural spheres, without which they perish in the routine of rigid pragmatics.

The collapse of the Soviet Union and subsequent changes in the alignment of political forces in Ukraine, at first glance, simplified the transition to a system of market relations. And this very transition has turned out to be a civilized “entry” into the market. But this euphoria instantly disappeared, faced with the reality of the economic crisis, the impoverishment of the majority of the population, the marginal pluralization of social consciousness. The processes taking place in the Ukrainian society show a dangerous tendency to increase the economic differentiation, accompanied by lumpenization of the population. Under such conditions, it is likely that the interests of social groups and strata of society will collide, and it is problematic to find their consensus.

Ukraine represents a whole spectrum of diverse interests of groups and strata, related to their current situation and future movement in the social hierarchy. Under these conditions, the issue of how economic entities entering the market will become of paramount importance. As the world experience shows, the best economic results have entities that own the resources and bear full financial responsibility for their use.

The state of mass consciousness of Ukrainian society is characterized by contradictions, segmentation, ideological and political “diversity”. According to the data of sociological monitoring of the Institute of Sociology of the National Academy of Sciences of Ukraine for 2017, in the political spectrum the most “popular” is the national democratic trend (14.5% of respondents prefer it). 10.2% of citizens of Ukraine, socialist – 5.8%, nationalist – 3.9%, communist – 3.8%, Christian-democratic – 3.7% are the adherents of the social-democratic direction.

For such a public consciousness there are various manifestations and tendencies, of which the main is democratic and authoritarian. The social foundations of these trends have a rather complicated structure. In addition to a relatively stable “core”, both democratic and authoritarian tendencies can be based on the same, and quite significant, strata of the population, which, on some issues, take a democratic stand, and on the other, they are supporters of authoritarian aspirations. Such a paradoxical situation is a logical reflection of socio-economic, political and socio-cultural processes inherent in a transitional, transformational society.

In an empirical dimension, the democratic tendency prevails in the public opinion of Ukrainian citizens. Thus, according to the opinion of 36.0% of the respondents among the majority of the population of Ukraine, the “Democracy” is the dominant feature. The advantage of authoritarianism is provided by 20.4% of citizens. And 25.4% of respondents do not favor any of them. At the same time, 22.8% of citizens agree that democracy provides the person with the greatest opportunities for an individual political choice, and 36.9% – rather agree with this statement. And only 10.4% of respondents hold the opposite opinion.

The authoritarian tendencies to a large extent are generated by the social stratification of Ukrainian society, its economic and political instability, not enough successful searches for the country’s coming out of the recession. The signs of authoritarian sentiment are differently traced both in social strata (who benefit from reforms) and among those whose financial situation

has actually worsened. The most democratically oriented is the social stratum, whose welfare has grown with a simultaneous loss of confidence in tomorrow. That is, it refers to people who perceive a market economy as a combination of growing opportunities and a rather high risk.

Currently, in Ukrainian society, there are two main types of value systems: 1) values based on the principles of equalization; 2) values that characterize a society of equal opportunities. In general, the first orientation is much less popular than a second one. According to monitoring data, the most close to Ukrainian citizens are the values, traditions and standards of behavior inherent in the population of the Western European countries. Thus, 16.5% of respondents give a clear preference to these values, and 14.6% are more likely to prefer them. It should be noted that a fairly large proportion of respondents prefer the values of citizens of East-Slavic countries (24.8%).

The main significance for the majority of the population is the value of life and the possibility of self-realization. From the point of view of the prevalence of paternalistic-conformist and individualistic types of mentality prevails individualistic orientation of the individual and the corresponding type of consciousness. The paternalistic type of consciousness is less specific to the Ukrainian population. Empirical evidence suggests that among the majority of the population such traits as individualism prevail (according to 44.2% of respondents). And only 18.0% believe that in the mentality of Ukrainians, collectivism prevails. At the same time, it is interesting to note that in the context of initiative-passivity characteristics, the second feature is dominant (41.2% of the respondents).

From the point of view of the socio-cultural dynamics (development) of society, the psycho-emotional state of Ukrainians has an important significance. According to the results of sociological monitoring, the psychological atmosphere in the Ukrainian society is most likely to be described by such feelings as the desire for change (40.7% of the respondents), insecurity (39.5%), anxiety (37.4%), disappointment (34, 0%), tension (32.0%), fear (27.2%), indignation (26.0%) and hope (22.8%). The future of Ukraine is connected with hope (as stated by 46.7% of the respondents), anxiety (34.3%), optimism (20.6%), confusion (16.5%), and fear (16.9%).

In the context of Ukrainian emotional state have reason to say that the particular individual life situation, combined with feelings of anger, fear, anxiety, frustration and insecurity are able to provide a splash of authoritarian attitudes. One should not forget that the desire for change is definitely associated with shame for the current state of the country, understanding the impossibility (disabilities) influence on what happens in society.

As we have already noted, Ukrainian citizens generally accept democracy in the first place, but primarily as a normative value. Democracy as a set of institutions, rules and procedures is still not widely and deeply perceived. In addition, the mass disappointment in the “democratic” reforms generates in society a primitive gravity toward a “strong hand”. Domestic historical consciousness, undoubtedly, leads to the cult of personalities and creates the possibility of degeneration of democracy into a regime of strong power. Arguably, this feature is stored throughout the period of transformation (dynamics) until the new social strata and groups and their interests are in the process of modernization.

The population as a whole does not support violent actions as a possible means of bringing the country out of crisis. For social stability, order and prosperity, most Ukrainian citizens disagree (at least in this case today) to pay a very high “democratic price”, to abandon fundamental democratic institutions. It is the recognition of democratic values (even at the level of the symbols) that remains a barrier to the totalitarian regeneration of power. The degree of rigidity of the system of governance (generally accepted by the public) serves as an alternative to the totalitarian regeneration of power and society, an alternative that seems to be more real than the strengthening of its own democratic institutions.

At the same time, not all citizens agree to endure all sorts of material difficulties for the sake of preserving the peace and order in the country, or in cases of significant deterioration of living conditions. Thus, 38.1% of respondents believe that it is necessary to actively protest against the constant deterioration of living conditions. And 36.2% – adhere to the idea that it is necessary at all costs to maintain peace in the country. At the same time, 55.7% of citizens do not consider mass protests (riots, demonstrations) against the decrease of living standards as the way of protection of their rights. The idea of taking part in protest actions is considered only by 21.3% of respondents. Citizens are most actively involved in collecting signatures under collective petitions (32.7% of respondents), in election campaigns (25.2%), legal rallies and demonstrations (29.1%). And 36.1% of the citizens state that none of the protest measures seems to be effective and reasonable enough for them to participate in it.

There is very significant difference in the verbal and real protest behavior of the Ukrainian population. According to empirical data, only 8.7% of respondents participated in protest actions against tariff increases over the last 12 months. 3.6% of the citizens protested in defense of their labor rights; against dismissal from work – 2.2%; insufficient financing of the industry – 1.6%; the exploitation of objects that carry a health hazard – 1.9%; illegal building, construction scams – 1.8%. 3.4% of the respondents personally participated in protest actions, related to insecurity of normal living conditions at the place of residence. Another 3.8% of respondents participated in actions focused on civil rights and freedoms. The vast majority of citizens (84.3%) did not participate in any of the protest actions.

The most active motivators of the possible participation of citizens in protest actions is the need to uphold justice (16.0% of the respondents), inability to tolerate living conditions (13.2%), and the way to influence the power (5.5%). At the same time, 15.6% of those polled will not take part in protest actions because they do not believe that something can be achieved, and 11.3% of respondents prefer to “defend their rights in court, not in the streets”. 6.8% of Ukrainian citizens do not show any interest in protest actions.

Nowadays, in Ukrainian society the lack of culture is one of the most acute shortages. The formation of a new, market culture takes place in confrontation with the consequences of the culture of administrative-command. After all, stereotypes of economic behavior do not disappear without a trace, but inherited, transmitted from the former systems to the future. Most of the population of Ukraine still has captive stereotypes that do not release and develop the potential of free economic growth of society.

The main stereotypes of mass consciousness include:

- a comparative ideal of material goods;
- the notion of the independence of the immorality of the acquired great wealth, the criminal nature of entrepreneurs, their exploiter nature;
- laying responsibility for the material welfare of a person (regardless of his own economic activity) to the state and the official system of social protection;
- a sense of personal responsibility for state ownership, which is expressed in maintaining a course to abandon real privatization;
- understanding of economic reform in the categories of administrative regulation of the economy.

The socio-cultural dynamics of society, of course, “means” the development (transformation) of culture. And it is undeniable that economic culture is a very important factor in this process. It is now quite obvious that Karl Marx’s thesis “the being determines the consciousness” does not “work” in the post-Soviet sphere and, in particular, in the Ukrainian society. In fact, it acts exactly the opposite way. It is the country’s economy that is determined

by the culture of the nation. That is, culture made an impact on the development of the economy. Thus, the behavior of the population to a large extent (and especially at the stage of market transformation) is determined by the level of its economic culture.

According to the results of sociological monitoring of the Institute of Sociology of the National Academy of Sciences of Ukraine conducted in 2017, 41.1% of respondents indicate that they do not have enough of modern economic knowledge. In this case, the cultured person is considered to have stable moral principles (54.0% of Ukrainian citizens agree with this). According to 52.0% of the polled, cultured person is a well-educated, tactful person who respects the thoughts of others. And 43.7% of the respondents consider the person, who is interested in cultural life, understands the matters of art, literature, music, etc as a cultured person. According to the opinion of 25.2% of citizens, a cultured person should be interested in national culture and take care of its development. Finally, 22.1% of the respondents see the cultured person as the one who is concerned about the moral and spiritual upbringing of the younger generation, and 23.7% – as the one who cares about nature and the environment.

The future of economic culture (as well as culture in general) depends not only on shifts in the minds and behavior of people, but also on institutional conditions. We mean the main institutions of society – politics, law, morality. The first institutional condition for the formation of a new economic culture is the political stability of society. In case of achievement of political agreement on the main directions of socio-economic transformation there will be the time and conditions for the formation of market relations and market culture. The second institutional condition for the formation of a new economic culture is the reorientation of old management structures in support of market relations, as well as the creation of new, effective management structures capable of providing such support. The third institutional condition is the introduction of legal economic structures, the possibility of capital investments. Finally, the fourth institutional condition is the moral well-being of the population. Indeed, in an atmosphere of moral raiding, criminal accumulation of capital and crime, the formation of a “normal” economic culture is impossible.

It is very difficult to form a market economic culture and in the absence of an effective system of economic education of the population, which has three main functions: educational, disciplinary and ideological (ideological support for reforms). The system of economic education should be aimed at “development” of such forms of the market, which correspond to national traditions and culture, reproduction of the ethics of labor. A certain system of education of citizens is needed, as well as awareness that adequate psychological preparation of the nation is an indispensable condition for the successful implementation of radical economic transformations [13, p. 109–110].

The most promising policy (action of the authorities) in this socio-economic situation can be modernization, which is based on economic initiative where it really appears, including legal protection from monopolies and arbitrariness of officials. The policy should be combined with a balanced state support of those productions and projects that can really stop the process of disappearing in the value added society, slipping into destructive reproduction. The most important elements of such a policy should be the development of the necessary infrastructure, which stimulates effective economic activity, support of the initiative of each person, small and medium business.

The real subject of modernization cannot be a state-monopoly of economic life, issuing policy plans of a coercive nature. They cannot be an isolated person, freed from the power of the state. The real subject can be (based on real culture) the dialogue between the state and the individual, a complex tense system of communities, where the real reproduction program

is constantly developed at all levels. Such a program implies a constant desire to shift the focus of this subject to the centers of economic initiative for modernization development.

From the point of view of the effectiveness of the impact on modernization processes in Ukrainian society, the most “attractive” (according to sociological monitoring) are domestic NGOs and associations (18.7% of respondents), international public organizations (18.4%), business centers (11.6%) and employers’ associations (9.1%). The contribution to the modernization of the Ukrainian society was estimated by 8.9% of citizens, the Verkhovna Rada influence – 6.2%, the Cabinet of Ministers – 5.1%. At the same time, 27.5% of respondents believe that the greatest obstacle to successful modernization is the lack of leaders capable of initiating (leading) this process. The unwillingness of the ruling elites to radically change (modernize) Ukrainian society drew the attention of 26.2% of citizens, and the reluctance of the authorities to bear costs (material, financial, time, etc.) – 24.7%.

The degree of autonomy of each subject of dynamic development (modernization) should be constantly critically rethought in accordance with the creative resources of a changing society. This requires a permanent political dialogue, pluralism based on the required level of agreement. Here, support is needed not only for liberalism. On the basis of the latter we should, in our opinion, develop a dialogue between traditionalism and liberalism, authoritarian and communal values. Moreover, the growing communicative role can play utilitarianism, its real and potential opportunities to stimulate economic activity.

This path cannot be easy. And here it is not worth hoping for success, jumping over the necessary stages, giving in to the historical temptation to see the destruction of the outlines of the new building. The future of society cannot be predicted only by extrapolation of our past. It is also about the ability of society to overcome its limitations on the basis of the development of new cultural values that are in line with the multidimensionality of the modern world. Necessary is not so much the desire to improve the effectiveness of reproduction within the framework of cultural programs and existing relations, but the desire to solve this problem based on more effective means and consolidating goals, the deepening of power (political) decisions up to super-civilizational scales.

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ВЛАДА В КОНТЕКСТІ СОЦІОКУЛЬТУРНОЇ ДИНАМІКИ СУСПІЛЬСТВА: ІСТОРИКО-СОЦІОЛОГІЧНИЙ АНАЛІЗ

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Мета роботи: розглянути інституцію влади в різні історичні періоди суспільного розвитку – від встановлення ленінської ідеології до сьогодення.

Методологія: основою дослідження є методологія, запропонована Ф. Броделем, яка стосується синтетичного підходу до визначення сутності культурно-цивілізаційних процесів через системний аналіз соціальних, економічних, історичних, політичних та інших складових. Саме це уможливило більш глибоко визначити динаміку, принципи, чинники, трансформації культурних особливостей розвитку суспільства в його цивілізаційних означеннях.

Наукова новизна дослідження полягає в тому, що автори значну увагу приділяють аналізу ринкової моделі сучасного українського суспільства в контексті становлення та функціонування демократичних цінностей.

Висновки: Аналізуючи владу в контексті соціокультурної динаміки суспільства, можна констатувати: історія ХХ століття визнала існування різних моделей розвитку соціуму. Ринкова модель розвитку суспільства передбачає наявність багатокладної економіки, ринкових регуляторів зі збереженням планових мікропропорцій, відкритості світогосподарським впливам, залучення в міжнародний розподіл праці, створення правової держави та громадянського суспільства. Україна репрезентує цілий спектр різноспрямованих інтересів груп і прошарків, пов'язаних з їхнім нинішнім становищем і майбутнім переміщенням у соціальній ієрархії. Стан масової свідомості українського суспільства вирізняється ідейно-політичним різноманіттям, з якого основними є демократична й авторитарна тенденції. Більшість населення України досі перебуває в полоні стереотипів, які не дають вивільнитися й розвинути потенціалові вільного економічного зростання суспільства. Майбутнє економічної культури залежить не тільки від зрушень у свідомості та поведінці людей, а й від інституційних умов. Найперспективнішою політикою в цій соціально-економічній ситуації повинна бути модернізація, що спирається на господарську ініціативу.

Ключові слова: суспільство, влада, демократія, ринок, динаміка, цінності, культура.