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PECULIARITY OF THE POLITICAL AXIOLOGY OF CLASSICAL CONSERVATISM

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This research paper attempts to explicate the peculiarities of the system of political axiology of classical conservatism. According to this attempt, a systemic panorama of the values foundations of conservatism ideology was demonstrated, in particular, the imperative binary correlates of order and freedom, integrity and diversity, sustainability and development were identified. The article nuanced that considering these categories in their dialectical integrity, we can talk about a convergent system of political axiology in conservatism. As in any other value and worldview system, this ideological and political current has a core element, which is the category of order; thus, it is from this element that the categorical value landscape of the entire ideological superstructure of conservatism, its awareness of a perfectly balanced political system, is formed. The complementary category of order is freedom, which is seen primarily as a qualitative positive freedom. The key structural units of the category of order are such socio-political phenomena as traditions, established political institutions and traditional (i.e. historical and social) morality. It has been determined that the binary of integrity and diversity also plays an extremely important role in maintaining the entire system of political values in conservatism. The last values we studied that correlate with each other were the categories of sustainability and reformism. Classical conservatism is rather neutral towards the categories of social development and can accept it if it meets the conditions of organic combination with traditional, i.e. sustainable, factors of society functioning, without which development turns into uncontrolled and inert formation of permanent changes that do not carry a constructive beginning.

Key words: political ideology, conservatism, political axiology, freedom, order, tradition, political unity.

Statement of the problem. In addition to the fundamental principles and characteristic features, in the form of fundamental philosophical dispositions and in the context of studying the ideology of classical conservatism, it is also necessary to articulate the factor features of political axiology, which will allow to expand the understanding of the value landscape of this ideology.

First of all, it is necessary to provide an optimal substantive and terminological definition of political axiology itself, which could be used to further deepen knowledge in the context of the conservative topic. Thus, the classical and acceptable nominal semantic definition of political axiology is the understanding that it is a special field of ethical and political science knowledge, the main purpose of which is to clarify the content of political values and value orientations, their interconnection and hierarchical structure, the role and place of values in political theory and practice [1]. Political axiology studies political values as determinants that guide the most important vectors of political activity in ideology, political culture and the political system. Political values are considered here as static qualitative indicators rather than variable constructs that can be configured each time according to the needs of the time. It should be noted that, in our opinion, each ideology has its own axiological system, the so-called political axiology, which ranks political values in a hierarchical system, giving some of them a dominant position; it also

determines the models of implementation of these dominant values in the practical political life of society. This leads to the conclusion that political axiology is an integral part of the political ideology of classical conservatism. In this context, we will explore the essence and correlation of the dominant political and philosophical categories: order and freedom, integrity and diversity, sustainability and reformism – but it should be noted, that these binary relations complement each other, not negate each other; there is not dualism, but dialectic between them. For example, “integrity disappears when freedom dies, regardless of how justified the power that kills it is; and free individualism, not based on moral values, rots in its core and soon creates conditions that pave the way for the acceptance of tyranny” [2, p. 346], F. Mayer is convinced. In the context of our study, we will focus exclusively on the theoretical and conceptual understanding of the axiological issues of this ideology, and will also try to give it a systemic dimension.

The purpose of the article is to explicate the systemic feature of the political axiology of classical conservatism, as well as to determine the essence of the categories of order and freedom, integrity and diversity, sustainability and reformism in this ideological and political doctrine.

Analysis of publications in which the solution to this problem has been initiated. It should be noted that the Ukrainian political and humanitarian scientific discourse has not substantively studied the issues of conservative axiology. Among those Ukrainian scholars who have tangentially studied the essence of axiology and its forms in conservatism, the following should be highlighted: Zherebyatnikova I. [1], Grabovsky S. [3], Panchenko Y. [11]. The international scientific community has paid attention to this issue: Evans M. [19], Maritain J. [8], O’Sullivan N. [24], Kristol I. [14], Scruton R. [6].

Outline of the main material. Starting the study of the problem of the essence, hierarchy and configuration of political values in the ideological and political doctrine of conservatism, we first articulate and consider the dualism of freedom and order. These categories are correlates of the qualitative dynamics of any political system, they form its internal coherence. However, we should immediately note that we will not be talking about the amount of freedom or the reactionary force of order that subordinates this freedom, but about their qualitative essence and characteristic substance, since, in our opinion, it is not constructive to discourse about the degree of desired freedom or the degree of order, as if they had become mathematical entities, and “the question should be what order and what freedom is the subject of dispute” [3, c. 304].

On the one hand, for conservative ideology, the category of order is the central organising and cornerstone concept of its entire political framework. In this context, there are two types of factors for the formation and maintenance of order: external, i.e. the existence of coercive institutions; and internal, i.e. the existence of certain social elements that help maintain order from within.

When we talk about the external factor, it should be noted that even T. Hobbes was convinced that without updating the form of order in society, the principle of the state of nature would dominate, according to which: “there is no place for diligence, since no one is guaranteed the fruits of his labour, and therefore there is no agriculture, shipping, maritime trade, comfortable buildings, crafts, literature, no society, – but there is always the danger of violent death, the thinker believes, – ...and human life is lonely, poor, hopeless, dull and short-lived” [4] – in other words, in such conditions there is no constructive idea of stability, in which a gradual and desirable development of social or political life is possible. That is why the thinker comes to the imperative of the existence of an external power authority or a powerful mechanism, in other words, Leviathan – a man-made earthly god, the main defence apparatus created by people in the process of social contract to prevent the functioning of social entropy, violence between people and anarchy. It is he who, as a supra-personal authority, is able to commit violence against

those who violate the fundamental rules of social arrangements, i.e., he has a wide range of political tools. That is why N. Berdyaev stated that “the elimination of the law of the state (as the main institution of order – *A. P.'s note*) for humanity, which is affected by sin, is a return to the animal state” [5]. This concept stems from the understanding of anthropological pessimism and represents the second, external, hypostasis of self-regulation of human behaviour.

The internal structural elements of the value category of order are traditions, established political institutions and moral obligation as factors of quantification of human arbitrariness: “personal independence will lead to true political order, not anarchy, only where there are customs and traditions” [6, p. 58]. In general, they can be labelled as the category of authority. This category serves as a solid foundation on which the informal idea of order is formed, which helps to limit human desire from the internal side, rather than from the external side, such as the state or law. Therefore, it is believed that the intention to reject traditional values and formulate categories of a new ethics is wrong, as it undermines the cementing principle of order that has allowed the formation of modern political and social systems.

Tradition is a fundamental functional element of the entire political doctrine of conservatism and represents the “greatest public good” [7, p. 73]. It should be noted that the understanding of tradition as a socio-political phenomenon is closely related to the historiosophical concept of conservatism and the criticism of political abstractionism. Conservatives believe that tradition is the basis of social order and culture, it helps to maintain stability in society. It is viewed as a social norm that has stood the test of time and represents a body of ancestral wisdom that should not be ignored in the political sphere. These are not arbitrary rules and agreements that emerge and disappear in the course of the development of political relations, but specific answers to specific questions about the essence of political and social phenomena and processes. They do not just happen by chance, but are the result of a long process of trial and error that has helped to shape the best ways of doing things and behaving. Tradition encapsulates supra-rational empirical observations of the reality of life that reflect the peculiarity of understanding political phenomena. Thus, it is an element of the transmission of ideas and doctrines, as well as a factor of the political system’s inheritance, which is based on the concept of prejudice. Prejudice, in turn, is traditional wisdom, which has become “a social imperative of political agency in connection with its embodiment in social practices and unspoken expectations... although the margin of discretion of each individual is small, society has a large accumulation of discretion” [6, p. 51] – which is called tradition or prejudice. That is why tradition is a form of knowledge without which the development of society was simply impossible. This knowledge is not a rationally or intellectually formed model, but a kind of empirical or practical wisdom “that goes much deeper, more precisely, and closer to the hidden complex core of the dynamism of human life than any artificial work of art” [8, p. 464]. It is this dynamic and creative understanding of tradition that distinguishes conservatism from another ideological and political trend – traditionalism. In our other research article, we stated that in conservatism, the political process “must integrate two extremely important principles: traditional imitation and creative activity, under the condition of their correlation in the status of a twofold dialectical relationship, that is, in their constructive and peaceful cooperation and coherence. Any absolutisation of each of these principles leads to a distortion of the principles of organic formation of social and political life and the actual destruction of the optimal functioning of any political system” [9].

The transmission of established traditions is an important feature of the normal establishment and functioning of a society, as they provide an understanding of good governance, integrate society in order and peace, and form a theoretical landscape for improving the existing political system. If they are not passed down from generation to generation and these social

maxims are violated, it can lead to the destruction of the social structure and threaten social stability. Therefore, tradition is the ontological foundation on which any state or social system should be built; and the ideal state cannot be created artificially, as it is necessarily a product of evolution, a product of a common culture, where the institution of traditions as a structure of the dialectical development of socio-political relations plays an important role.

A characteristic feature of traditions, in the context of the value of political order, is that they are social regulatory components of the functioning of the socio-political system. Along with laws, they perform almost the same functions, but because they are impersonal, they have a specific epistemological characteristic of transcendence, which increases their authority in the eyes of citizens, like any sacred phenomenon.

Also, respect for traditions is based on the value belief that traditions form a sense of identity for an individual and a social and political community. Since there is no universal primordial tradition for the ideological doctrine of conservatism, as is the case, for example, with traditionalism, each system of traditions reflects the historical and political formation of a particular nation and shapes its self-identity. This idea was described quite vividly by W. Lipman: “but traditions are more than a culture of skills and sciences. They are the public world with which our private worlds are connected. This continuum of public and private memory goes beyond the immediate, natural lives of people, it unites them with each other” [10, p. 123] – this is the way individuals and individuals are initiated into members of a certain society, i.e. by instilling in them the special nodal traditions of the society on which it functions.

For conservatism, there is an extremely important structure that is manifested in established political institutions, which in turn are products of socio-political aspects of tradition, which are part of the complex of general traditions of culture and society. They form a certain type of awareness of political existence, peculiarities of its existence and functioning, and characteristic features for each individual nation. The components of the genesis of traditional political institutions are political history, political archetypes, political consciousness, etc. – it is through the integration of many factors, both external and internal, that classical institutions of political reality in a state are formed.

Morality is viewed as a traditional stepwise, intellectually comprehended social construct that functions in its entirety, regardless of external conditions, and that avoids the inclusive use of individual ethical structural prescriptions. It is a long-term result of historical progress: “the rules of morality are the result of the development of human society, so they cannot be changed” [11]. The importance of the existence of morality lies in the fact that it gives a universal dimension to social relations, which implements and maintains the socio-political order from within: “the prescriptions of traditional morality should be perceived as prescriptions of practical reason, which do not provide or require evidence to support them, and the “misunderstanding” of which means the loss of humanity, or the non-existence of values at all...” [12, c. 158]. That is why traditional morality, as a factor in the formation of political order, should remain supra-individual and impersonal, so as not to reflect only the interests of a particular social group or class. Thus, the ideology of conservatism refuses to recognise class or national morality and considers them to be a form of ethical subjectivism that is in no way compatible with the concepts of freedom and law.

The study of the foundations of traditional morality begins the formation of an organic personality and the search for a perfect model of human coexistence and political development. V. Lypynsky predicted that the basis of any social action is the moral principalisation of existence: “no human community capable of life and creativity can exist without its own internal morality, without its own firm concept of good and evil... Only such a conviction in the rightness of its

desires gives each community moral strength, without which no creative action is possible” [13, p. 196]. As we can see, traditional morality in conservatism still provides a legitimising springboard for constructing the order of the political system of society and gives the power of an ethical standard to political reality. In general, it is the fundamental basis of politics, since without an understanding of right and wrong, politics will turn into a struggle of particular interests of individuals and social groups that will not care about the welfare of the people but will defend their own ideals. Therefore, a characteristic feature of morality is its two-component essence, which is divided into passive and active bases. The passive one is seen as an ethical category of human existence that does not allow society to exist in social disorder, while the active one is a political category that has a creative constitutive beginning and serves to build a holistic and just society and state.

The basis of morality is the phenomenon of duty as an element of social existence, which organises human freedom within certain substantive limits of the common good. This is how a new type of legality is postulated, and this imperative for the existence of a “generally accepted theory of political obligation” [14, p. 220], which forms a special type of awareness of oneself and others in a social system, as well as the idea of belonging to this system, when the concept of duty to fulfil certain social and civic obligations is implicit. Without this awareness of moral obligation, it is impossible to build either social integrity or a state, as they are based on the category of agreement, which, in turn, incorporates the concept of obligation. That is why the emphasis on the individual’s duties towards the larger whole of which he is a part, rather than on the use of his own rights for his own freedom, is a characteristic feature of the ethical doctrine of classical conservatism.

However, we should not assume that by stating the primacy of moral duties over individual desire, individual freedom is levelled. One of the main tasks of the moral order in society is to protect and preserve freedom, since only order can act as a theoretical disposition of the existence of freedom and provide an understanding of its ontological basis for human existence. This order provides the idea of respect for a person, his or her life, and, as a consequence, for its manifestations through freedom, which is then enshrined in law. “Meanwhile, the only possible basis on which respect for the value of the human person and for freedom as the highest value can be maintained is faith in an organic moral order. Without such a belief, no doctrine of political and economic freedom can stand” [15, p. 351], states F. Meyer. We should also add that political freedom that does not rely on the general recognition of personal duty to fulfil one’s obligation loses the basis for its existence. Thus, the loss of faith in a higher system of moral values uncompromisingly leads to the loss of ethical orientation, and as a result, leads society to a state of general nihilism. This is how the conservative opposition is formed: either belief in the transcendent strengthening of the moral order, or the existence of nihilism and the elimination of responsibility.

This is where the great respect for religion in the ideology of classical conservatism comes from, as it is seen as the quintessence of morality, not as a doctrinaire dogmatism of the proper. It was Christian values that began to carry the ideas of universal morality, which later became part of social and political life. Many conservative thinkers do not see the development of modern states without an awareness of these Christian values of morality, duty, freedom, etc. Morality in itself is necessary for the optimal existence of society and the state, and the latter, for its own prosperity and development, since such an important component of social institutions as religion has a universal and large-scale impact on the whole society, which helps it to promote ethical ideas more successfully. In the retrospective optics of the analysis, we can see an understanding of the large-scale nature of morality in the principles of Christianity, which makes transcendent ethical attitudes accessible to people and at the same time emphasises the possibility of self-improvement.

To conclude the analysis of the essence of political order, it should be emphasised that its sources are not state (external) or moral (internal) coercion. Rather, it is the rationalisation of the conditions of human existence in which they could implement the process of self-development and improvement of the surrounding world. This imperative understanding of the importance of order and the ways to achieve it is the essence of the laws of the rational structure of society in the sense that all people, if they are rational, will understand their self-evidence: “the rationality of order consists in a set of conditions, the observance of which will ensure the realisation of a person’s ability to live a good life in this life. These are the conditions on which a broad consensus of rational persons is ensured...” [10, c. 111].

On the other hand, the problem of understanding the essence and characteristics of the category of freedom as a fundamental value of human existence arises. V. Lypynskyi was convinced that “the hard struggle of the farmer (synonymous with the conservative – *A. P.’s note*) with nature requires progress, discipline, organisation; but it cannot do without individual freedom” [16, p. 122]. Thus, the dialectic of order and freedom seeks to create a new qualitative concept of freedom, which is significantly different from the freedom of individualism, liberalism or anarchism. Thus, conservatism articulates a qualitative idea of freedom that directly affects the conditions of personal development, based on which personal freedom should be united on the categories of duty, responsibility and the idea of a common goal. Its basis is thus considered to be the statement of the possibility of each individual to develop without obstacles from others, which is consistent with the rights and responsibilities of his or her own personality. The notion of freedom in conservatism also has its own peculiarities and can be generally considered in both positive (internal) and negative (external) terms. The negative understanding may be as follows: it is a guarantee that a person who acts solely on the basis of his or her own awareness will be protected from external volitional attitudes, and that “a person in his or her actions in accordance with the idea of his or her own duty will be protected against the pressure of the authorities and the majority, customs and generally accepted opinions” [17, p. 290]. In contrast, there is a positive or internal concept of freedom, which is primarily seen as the possibility of full action of the human will, which is organised by legal consciousness and ethical reasoning, which forms a person’s understanding of their potential models of development, as well as their limitations. Thus, it is postulated that it is important to establish internal freedom with an external discipline that supports the former – this can be seen as a harmonising separation of the spheres of subjective and social freedom.

An important element of the existence of freedom is its limitation, in order to prevent personal arbitrariness, which in the future can create conditions for the emergence of anarchy. This principle of quantification of the freedom factor also boils down to an understanding of anthropological pessimism, since “man, if left to himself, is too evil to be free”, which is why the first task in achieving political freedom is a deep analysis of human nature, since without this, such a priori freedom can lead to social chaos. It is impossible to free a person from evil through freedom, or vice versa, it is impossible to give a person true freedom by rejecting evil. Therefore, these restrictions, as imperatives of society and human existence, must necessarily exist and, in turn, be based on many factors: traditions, political and legal institutions, moral duties, etc. – all of which help to determine the responsibility of citizens and ensure that all citizens benefit from freedom. It should be noted that, for example, E. Burke was not in favour of total state control over the activities of his subjects and defended individual rights, but rejected the other extreme – absolute personal freedom as a source of social explosions and disorder, seeing it as a dangerous trigger for anarchy and erosion of social values. An absolute and individualised awareness of freedom will not lead to constructive action, and such a strongly actualised individual freedom is

not the sum or substitute for all the things for which society exists: “for freedom to be realised, it must be limited and the range of these limitations must be variable” [18, p. 299] – therefore, freedom itself must be institutionally limited for its own sake, so that people continue to see it as the highest social and political value.

Also, in this value system, the category of freedom receives an ethical modality, since through freedom people gain the potential to search for and realise the good. Thus, it is characterised as a boundary concept that is located at the point of intersection between good and evil, and in itself it carries a neutral teleological connotation, but only with its calculation to the human will a certain personal choice of a person is formed, which has a specific moral dimension. Thus, “from the point of view of a conservative, the right choice is the ultimate value, and freedom is an instrumental, hence auxiliary value” [19, p. 383], S. Evans is convinced. But such an instrumentalised understanding of freedom does not mean that it plays a secondary role in the search for the ethical meaning of existence; on the contrary, without it, there would be no possibility of this search, and therefore freedom is the main and cornerstone factor in the possibility of forming an ethical vector of improvement. This leads to the following law: since freedom is a condition for value, value is a guarantor of freedom. Therefore, for conservatism, it is important not so much to free a person for the sake of his or her natural well-being, but rather to limit his or her tendency to entail evil as much as possible. Based on this, it should be noted that the essential political freedom is inseparably linked to the moral responsibility of a person, as discussed above: “we can breathe the air of freedom only insofar as we are ready to bear the burden of moral responsibility associated with it” [20, p. 365]. Some authors, such as E. Burke, D. Cortes, W. Röpke and others, have derived a certain regularity of the nature of human freedom: a person, minimising his/her internal control over his/her own freedom, allows for greater control over it from the outside, for example, the state, legislation, etc. Therefore, in order to annihilate the influence of any external factors on freedom (i.e. to increase negative freedom), people must realise the importance of moral (i.e. internal) self-restraint of their freedom.

This political category is not considered in conservatism as an absolute self-referential good, an a priori good that stands at the top of the value pyramid (as, for example, it exists in the ideology of liberalism). An important factor is the peculiarity of its incorporation into the general political system of values, so that it balances and counterbalances this system – which is one of the fundamental characteristics of the category of order. Thus, E. Burke wrote: “I must refrain from congratulating France on her new freedom until I know how this freedom has been combined with government, with the power of the public, with the discipline and obedience of the army, with morality and religion, with peace and order, with public and social customs” [21, p. 287] – so, we see that freedom itself does not represent some ideal common political value, since in the natural state all people were absolutely free, but still, people decided to get out of it by creating a certain system of management and governance, in which freedom occupies a certain important place.

Conservative axiology is characterised by a critical attitude towards the perception of abstract freedom, which is not supported by any formalised factors. Lord D.E.E. Acton, a great fighter for human freedom, nuanced that the sources of freedom form the framework within which it is constructed, and distinguished among them the following: the doctrine of national tradition and the doctrine of the higher law “the principle that the idea of freedom arises from its roots, by gradual development rather than by substantial change; and the principle that all political freedoms should be tested and reformed in accordance with a code not created by man” [17, p. 291]. These sources help to understand freedom concretely. By eliminating the abstract understanding of freedom and emphasising its substance, a new characteristic *modus operandi* is

given to this category, namely: not freedom for all, but freedom for everyone, based on objectively understandable human interests and ideas.

A characteristic feature of the understanding of the dialectic of order and freedom in conservative doctrine is that the former is the ontological disposition of the latter's existence: without social and political order, freedom cannot exist. Therefore, we come to the following description of these categories: order is the basis of the political system, its central organising and fundamental structural element, from which the superstructure, i.e. human freedom, develops: "conservatives, on the other hand, interpreted personal freedom as deriving from political order. According to conservatives, it is not the free choice that creates the political order that makes it legitimate, but the free choice created by the political order" [6, p. 33] – it is because of this provision that we can conclude that freedom is not the basis of the social order, but is one of its by-products. Therefore, conservative thought is characterised by an emphasis on the importance of self-restraint of the individual and the existence of social and ethical obligations, as well as the primacy of eternal moral values associated with the traditional factor of society's existence, which are reflected in social relations, thus maintaining order in society. That is why M. Yakubovsky and A. Shahaï, analysing the ideas of the modern conservative researcher A. Bloom, stated that "instead of the language of individual powers, he preferred the language of individual responsibilities, instead of believing in the value of freedom and self-realisation, he would like to promote belief in the value of self-restraint and personal virtue" [7, p. 187]. On the other hand, the functioning of the order is not possible without its apologetics on the part of individuals, and the fundamental condition for this support is the free perception of this order. Therefore, there is also no true order without authority, which is formed on the basis of freedom, or, in other words, on the concept of free loyalty to the ontologically established order. Thus, we can state that the value categories of order and freedom in the classical ideology of conservatism are interconnected.

The next important component of the political axiology of conservatism is the binary linkage of integrity and diversity. J. Maritain highly valued political integrity, describing it as a social phenomenon of "the highest or most perfect form" [8, p. 263]. The central constant of the category of integrity is the idea of organic unity of society based on the recognition of common traditional, moral and political institutions, and along with this, the factor of maintaining law and order. All of the above is the integrative force that allows the constituent parts of the political community to function without leading to disintegration: provinces are diverse but subject to a strict hierarchy; social groups differ in opinions and views but do not escape the ideological root cause; cultural differences are intensified in a complex form of centre supremacy; thus, the central logos of integrity dominates the entire national organism, but does not repress or limit the latter, but optimises the work of a complex and multidimensional mechanism. Schematically, the essence of this phase can be illustrated in the following theoretical variation: various structural and functional elements (spheres of socio-cultural existence of the political system) begin to individualise and develop in their own logic of action and even tend to alienate when the original master idea attracts them and places them in a strict metaphysical framework that does not allow for disintegration of the system. Any new forms and factors of the political or social system process adapt to the already formed integral system, thus complicating and differentiating it.

However, there is no need to ethatise the understanding of political integrity, which is extremely unacceptable for classical conservative ideology. The state plays a fundamental and centrally organising role in the formation of the political whole, but it does not represent the form of the whole. The state is seen as its formalised part, specialising in the general interests of the whole, which is manifested in its regulatory and regulatory functions: "especially with regard to the maintenance of the law, the promotion of general welfare and public order, and the

management of public affairs” [8, p. 465] – but in no way in despotic control over society. The state is superior only in relation to other bodies or collective parts of the political whole, but in no way dominates it or absorbs it.

Social diversity or heterogeneity is also an important dialectical condition for the functioning of a coherent organism, since only a differentiated socio-political order has a relevant landscape for the formation of freedom and creativity. Political integrity is formed from a multitude of social units: families, social groups, trade unions, cultural or educational associations, etc., but all of them “are thus embraced by the higher unity of political integrity” [8, p. 464]. Of course, they have their own degree of autonomy, without which they would not be considered free social initiatives and would not be based on the concept of freedom. Therefore, the religious, educational, familial, cultural – all of this is as fundamental and important for the existence of political integrity as political integrity is for them, without which they would not have formal and institutional forms of self-realisation. The individual has the potential for self-development only in heterogeneous societies, in the “flourishing complexity” of the socio-political whole, where the goal is to distinguish a special connection, namely unity in diversity. This polyphony of structural connections between autonomous and heterogeneous parts and the political whole is a feature of the axiological understanding of the dialectic of “whole-diverse”. However, if political integrity prevails and society is transformed into a homogeneous set of identical atomistic individuals, the social sphere will be deprived of creativity and initiative, which will lead to the decomposition of the political whole, which will not receive a sufficient number of constitutive elements for existence and development.

Thus, for conservative ideology, preserving the political integrity of society, its culture and traditions is a key priority. They believe that this will help preserve the substantive stability of society and support the actual development of the components of this integrity.

Another fundamental factor in the analysis of the political axiology of the ideology of classical conservatism is the consideration of the peculiarities of the relationship between the categories of sustainability and reformism. Classical conservatism, in contrast to other types of conservatism, is neutral towards the development of political systems, seeing it as a fundamental and organic ontological factor of formation, but is quite critical of the concept of progress, which is based on a priori principles of reforming reality, since “rosy theories of progress and a perfect society have too often led to cruelty and lowering of the human level in practice” [5]. The understanding of progress as a unanimous and joint movement towards new and ideal models of society requires a general ideological mobilisation of people; it should strive for ideological homogeneity, which in turn undermines the understanding of positive human freedom discussed above: “the notion of progress is thus absorbed by the notion of universal evolution, losing elements of freedom and even improvement” [22, p. 336]. That is why such ideas of universal progress were accompanied by terror against those who disagreed, as we can see in the examples of the French Revolution or the period of collectivisation and the cultural revolution in the USSR. Therefore, the value category of political stability plays an important role in maintaining order, freedom and the gradual development of society.

The purpose of introducing new elements of the system is to keep it relevant, but the peculiarity of their integration is that the system remains stable when only individual structural elements are modified and configured. This is the very principle described by E. Burke in his maxim: “i would by no means exclude change, but if I were to change something, it would be in order to preserve it” [23, p. 473] – thus, the political system continues to protect its fundamental principles of functioning, but, based on the conditions of the time, supplementing it with new forms. All transformations that occur in the course of historical development of society cannot

affect the very quintessence of the system on which political reality is built. That is why the political ideal for classical conservatives is real and empirical political activity, which is constituted on the basis of principles of wisdom that can be easily verified.

It should be noted that, of course, without political intentionality and reformism, any political structure will not be able to meet the challenges of the times, and classical conservative thinkers and researchers are well aware of this. Therefore, political creativity generates the necessary vigorous progress to realise the necessary changes and incorporate them into the existing static political institutions and traditions: “the conservative beginning is not in itself the opposite of development, it only requires that development be organic, that the future does not destroy the past but continues to develop it” [5]. Thus, the characteristic basis of development is organicity, which is the main line that runs through the entire ideology of conservatism, and is also implemented in the field of reformism, where the most important thing is the preventive elimination of any antagonistic tendencies in the system that can lead to the immanent collapse of principles. The dialectical development of the socio-political system here is fully reflected in the following logical construction: there is a certain stable fundamental basis based on traditions and wisdom of the ages, and variable components are added to it, which complement and expand the features of those fundamental principles, resulting in the complexity and scaling of the system itself. In practice, such a rationally constructed schematic model of society claims to “strengthen the evolutionary elements of social development” [24].

We emphasise that the cementing elements of the reform process should be the principles of caution and comprehensiveness, which will not allow creating unstable and negative social conditions for the system. “Following the path of slow but well-supported progress, we keep an eye on the consequences of each step; the success or failure of the first step sheds light on the second, and so, from one flash of light to the next, we move steadily along the way” [25, p. 478] – this process of gradual evolution is the most suitable for a conservative understanding of development. This is the basis for the criteria of political wisdom in decision-making, namely: consistency and reliance on existing principles, with the condition of their protection.

Classical conservatism has traditionally treated revolution with great caution and scepticism. In his work *Reflections on the Revolution in France* (1790), E. Burke emphasises that power inherited from one noble representative to another is inherently creative and interested in promoting development. Revolution, on the contrary, seeks to wipe out everything that was created by the previous government. At the same time, revolutionaries are hampered in their efforts to build something that would be no worse than the rejected one by the lack of proper management experience and, at times, by the lack of theoretical knowledge of political reality. Therefore, conservative ideology views revolution as a dangerous and unnecessary form of social change that can lead to the destruction of traditional values, disruption of law and order and threats to the stability of society, as well as to destabilisation of the political and social order, disruption of law and order, and a sense of uncertainty and helplessness among people. All of these conclusions are based on the data of historical retrospect, which has demonstrated the infernal results of revolutionary transformations: “in England, the revolution and civil war did not lead to the rule of saints, but contributed to the establishment of a military dictatorship, then the Restoration and everything was lost. In France – the revolution, the Jacobin destabilisation, the military dictatorship, the Paris Commune” [26, p. 159]. Therefore, the task of conservative politics is not to defeat the revolution, but to prevent its formation through a harmonious combination of interests and the search for the common good.

Conclusions. Thus, having actualised an important component of the ideology of classical conservatism, namely, political axiology, we can conclude that all value binaries complement each

other in a dialectical unity and form an organic structure of conservatism's value orientations. In this context, we have analysed the correlation of the dominant political categories that we have considered in binary relations: order and freedom, integrity and diversity, sustainability and reformism. Thus, the category of order is a centrally organising political value, and its structural elements are such social phenomena as traditions, established political institutions and traditional morality. Alongside this fundamental category is another – the category of freedom, which is considered in a qualitative and restrictive configuration. A characteristic feature of the understanding of the dialectic of order and freedom in conservative doctrine is that the former is the ontological disposition of the latter's existence: without social and political order, freedom cannot exist. At the same time, the latter organises order on the basis of a free and organic union, and prevents the conditions for a dictatorship of order from forming. The other link is integrity and diversity, which can be described as follows: various structural and functional elements (spheres of socio-cultural existence of a political system) begin to individualise and develop in their own logic of action and even tend to alienate when an original master idea attracts them and places them in a strict metaphysical framework that does not allow for disintegration of the system. At the same time, an important dialectical factor is the heterogeneity of the social system, since only a differentiated socio-political system has a relevant landscape for the formation of freedom and creativity of individuals. The last complementary values we studied were the categories of sustainability and reformism. Classical conservatism is rather neutral towards the categories of social development and can accept it if it meets the conditions of organic combination with traditional, i.e. sustainable, factors of society functioning, without which development turns into an uncontrolled and inert formation of permanent changes that do not carry a constructive beginning. In turn, as we have seen, organic reformism is a very important component of the existence and development of society, since the purpose of introducing new elements of the system is the relevance of its existence, but the peculiarity of their integration is the principle that the system remains stable when only individual structural elements are modified and configured, “where the conservative and positive socio-political energies combine to form the actual, which potentialises the process of imitation for the future, and the imitative principle is realised in the awareness of the existence of objective norms of social and political reality” [9]. A characteristic feature of these binary relations is that they coexist in harmonious unity, which allows us to consider conservative axiology as a balanced large-scale system of values. This organic and integrative understanding of different political values is a feature of the ideology of political conservatism.

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ОСОБЛИВІСТЬ ПОЛІТИЧНОЇ АКСІОЛОГІЇ КЛАСИЧНОГО КОНСЕРВАТИЗМУ

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В данній науковій роботі була зроблена спроба реалізувати есплікацію особливості системи політичної аксіології класичного консерватизму. Відповідно до цієї спроби було продемонстровано системну панораму ціннісних засад ідеології консерватизму, а також, відповідно до цього, виявлено імперативні бінарні кореляції: порядку та свободи, цілісності та різноманітності, сталості та розвитку. В статті було нюансовано, що розглядаючи ці категорії в діалектичній цілісності ми можемо вести мову про конвергентну систему політичної аксіології в консерватизмі. Як і в будь-якій іншій ціннісно-світоглядній системі в даній ідейно-політичній течії наявний ядровий елемент, яким виступає саме категорія порядку; так, відштовхуючись саме від нього і формується категоріальний ціннісний ландшафт усєї ідеологічної надбудови консерватизму, його усвідомлення ідеально збалансованої політичної системи. Ключовими структурними одиницями категорії порядку є такі суспільно-політичні феномени, як: традиції, усталені політичні інститути та традиційна (тобто історико-соціальна) мораль. В той же час, комплементуючою категорією порядку виступає свобода, яка розглядається першочергово у якості якісної позитивної свободи. Було детерміновано, що бінарна зв'язка цілісності та різноманітності також відіграє надзвичайно важливу роль у підтриманні усєї системи політичних цінностей у консерватизмі. Останніми цінностями, які ми дослідили та які корелюються між собою, були категорії сталості та реформізму. Класичний консерватизм досить нейтрально ставиться до категорій суспільного розвитку і може сприймати його, якщо він відповідає умовам органічного поєднання з традиційними, тобто сталими, чинниками функціонування суспільства, без яких розвиток перетворюється на безконтрольне та інертне становлення перманентних змін, які не несуть в собі конструктивного начала.

Ключові слова: політична ідеологія, ідеологія консерватизму, політична аксіологія, свобода, порядок, традиція, політична єдність.