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PLEASURE AND PAIN AS CRITERIA OF CONSTITUTION OF VALUES IN AXIOLOGICAL VIEWS OF H. LOTZE

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This article investigates the axiological views of Hermann Lotze through the prism of the analysis of the feelings of pleasure and pain. In the philosophical views of Hermann Lotze one can trace the important role of pleasure and pain as criteria of constitution of values. Pleasure and pain can be regarded as those axiological parameters that are opposed to, for example, the formal axiology of I. Kant, which does not have a clear practical criterion of values and is grounded only on categorical imperative and simultaneously demands an active feeling of duty, and also faith in free will, God, and the immortality of the soul, which are the main motives of moral and axiological behaviour and accordingly support the feeling of duty. In contrast with Immanuel Kant exactly through pleasure and pain that Hermann Lotze tries to overcome the borders between idealism and empiricism, expressing the idea of unity of the body and soul, and on these grounds he criticizes materialism and positivism, which are one dimensional in questions of the nature of a human and their soul. In Hermann Lotze's views, pleasure and pain are not just mere subjective experiences of a human, but also reliable practical axiological criteria that are the fundamental grounds for the formation of values. Moreover, pleasure and pain are experienced by all humans regardless of their ideological, religious, philosophical, and other various identifications, and therefore, they can be empirical criteria for the verification of values and the verification of various moral and axiological theories for their truthfulness. Through the dynamics of feelings of pleasure and pain, Hermann Lotze was able to combine the sphere of individual subjective human experience and the objective nature of values. Pleasure and pain express the harmony or disharmony of body and soul and the human and cosmos, and indicate the nature of general good, truth, and beauty. Based on affective experiences of pleasure and pain Hermann Lotze criticizes the formal axiology of Immanuel Kant and creates elements of a hedonistic approach to the understanding of the nature of values, which is later traced in Max Scheler's axiology, who also develops his axiology on the level of feelings. On this basis, the emotional experiences of humans, particularly pleasure and pain can be interpreted as criteria of verification of moral and axiological theories in modern philosophic discussions.

Key words: pleasure, pain, formal axiology, hedonism, pragmatism, unity of body and soul, secularization, phenomenological axiology.

Introduction. Hermann Lotze can be viewed as one of the most prominent figures of the Western European philosophy of the nineteenth century, whose teachings became one of the reasons and grounds for the formation of non-formal axiology based on granting the feelings of pleasure and pain the functions of the constitution of values. By having such an approach to the nature of values he stands on the critical position regarding formal axiology and formal ethics of I. Kant. If the basis of axiology and ethics in I. Kant's views are the categorical imperative, which urges to the most optimal behaviour based on the feeling of duty, and also the faith in God, free will, and the idea of the immortality of the soul, then in Hermann Lotze's views the criteria of identification of values are human experiences in the form of pleasure and pain, which, however,

should not be comprehended as purely accidental or situational. Pleasure and pain, on the contrary, are the fundamental or even metaphysical grounds of the constitution of values, because they, in Hermann Lotze's views, express the unity of body and soul, which indicates the syncreticity of human nature and its unity with the cosmos.

Specifically, the original nature of values, according to the teachings of H. Lotze, is deeply rooted in the metaphysical nature of a human, particularly in the unity of body and soul, which expresses at the same time the unity of a human and cosmos. A human functions as a microcosmos, and the feelings of pleasure and pain based on the unity of body and soul express their harmony or disharmony, and also harmony and disharmony of a human and the world. Therefore, exactly the dynamics of feelings of pleasure and pain are the fundamental basis of the constitution of values since they express the relation between body and soul and between a human and the world. Moreover, pleasure and pain by their essence are also criteria of understanding of objective values – good, truth, beauty, and also benefit in the context of existence, whereas a human is a particular microcosmos that resides in relation to existence based on the feelings of pleasure and pain. The goal of this article is to examine the formation of the concept of values in Hermann Lotze's views on the grounds of the meaning of the feelings of pleasure and pain in the processes of the constitution of values, which are, at the same time, the criteria of the constitution of values and the criteria of the relation of human to the world.

Pleasure and pain in H. Lotze. The axiological concept of Hermann Lotze is multifaceted. On the one hand, the criterion of values in H. Lotze is the significance of phenomena as their attribution to values, the significance itself in their objectively ideal form, and therefore the criterion of values in the form of “significance” has a theoretical dimension and by its features resembles axiological formalism of I. Kant. However, on the other hand, the criterion of attribution to values is the feeling of pleasure and pain, which has an empirical meaning and can be interpreted pragmatically and even hedonistically.

H. Lotze's idea that the criteria for attribution to values can be the feeling of pleasure and pain is close in its sense to the views of I. Kant and has a phenomenological dimension. According to the Kantian position, “Moral concepts are not entirely pure concepts of reason, because they are grounded on something empirical (pleasure or displeasure)” [3, p. 552]. By analogy with I. Kant, H. Lotze emphasizes that the feeling of pleasure is “...connected with the concept of value, which brings his ideas closer to pragmatism and utilitarianism” [1, p. 6]. In particular, H. Lotze believes that among the forces that set our activity in motion is “...the effort to hold fast pleasure, or to regain it, and to avoid pain, are the only springs of all practical activity” [4, p. 688]. In this aspect, pleasure and pain indeed can be interpreted as criteria of practical human behaviour, which are the direct motives of human actions. As put by M. Textor, “Lotze... developed Kant's suggestion that pleasure is the feeling of furthering life and pain that of hindering life. The feelings of pleasure and pain that, in part, constitute interest ‘measure’ the value of the object of presentation for an organism” [7, p. 2]. Namely, H. Lotze considers pleasure and pain as “besides all which exists and which happens according to settled laws, there is also enjoyment of both, also pain and pleasure” [4, p. 683]. In this regard, Hermann Lotze expresses the ideas, which later will become close to the philosophy of life, emphasizing the significance of pleasure and pain in vital processes.

For H. Lotze “...pleasure and dissatisfaction are fundamental causes and motives of actions, while he identifies pleasure and good, and therefore the feeling of pleasure plays an important role in the context of the formation of a moral principle and the constitution of value...” [1, p. 6–7]. From this perspective, H. Lotze believes that through the feeling of pleasure and dissatisfaction, the integrity of the human “I” is formed, because “...it is in the feelings

of pleasure and pain that the Ego is first conscious that all its individual states belong to it ...” [4, p. 687]. From this angle, aesthetic aspects in Hermann Lotze’s axiology precede moral and axiological ones, because exactly pleasure is the criterion of a good, and this indicates the importance of sensuality in his axiology and simultaneously demonstrates the processes of secularization of philosophical thinking, which begins to be grounded on individual human criteria in the sphere of morality and axiology, and not on the transcendent ones.

In such a sense pleasure and pain are also criteria of constitution of unity of human on the level of body and soul. Such thought is important in the sense that pleasure and pain can be reliable criteria for the self-identification of a human and the verification of the truthfulness of various theories of identification, which on the theoretical level can allegedly appear logically true, but on the practical level only bring a human discomfort, suffering, and pain. In this aspect of the understanding of “value” in H. Lotze has a pragmatic and hedonistic dimension, that is, it is associated with the processes of pleasure and pain, but I will note that this is the sensory pleasure or dissatisfaction of the subject. At the same time, the processes of pleasure and pain are subjective criteria for the significance of phenomena and therefore this indicates the phenomenological dimension of H. Lotze’s axiological views because the subject himself experiences the feelings of pleasure and pain.

Based on the feelings of pleasure and pain in the views of H. Lotze a hedonistic approach to the concept of “value” can be traced. He thinks hedonistically regarding the understanding of the concept of “value” and criticizes ethical formalism since he believes that “There is no doubt something to praise in the austerity with which practical philosophy has sought to free moral precepts from indirect reference to the personal interest of the agent; but this austerity was wrong in seeking to undo the plain and indissoluble connection between the notion of Pleasure despised, and in most of its applications despicable and the notion of Worth in general” [4, p. 690]. In this aspect, the philosopher criticizes formal ethics and the formal axiology of I. Kant and believes that “no system of morality which has attempted to derive the circle of duties or of moral ideals from one supreme principle, has accomplished more than a comprehensible logical subordination under this principle of that which is said to be derived from it” [4, p. 696]. That is, if a moral theory is based only on moral postulates without their connection with the reality of human existence, then such a moral theory is not successful. Formal ethics and formal axiology can only urge to the optimal behaviour, but it does not give any practical reliable criteria of verification for the truthfulness of their statements.

From the point of view of H. Lotze, a person grasps and learns values in the context of hedonism or even pragmatism, that is, based on feelings of pleasure or displeasure. The philosopher believes that “...the capacity of feeling pleasure and pain must be originally inherent in the soul; also the separate events of the train of ideas, reacting on the nature of the soul, do not produce the capacity, but only rouse it to utterance; moreover, whatever feelings may sway the soul, they do not beget effort, they only become motives for a power of volition which they find existing in the soul, but which, were it absent, they could never inspire” [4, p. 179]. That is, the feeling of pleasure – pain, and other feelings are in this case a priori. At the same time, H. Lotze believes that the feeling of pleasure and pain gives rise to volition [4, p. 179]. On this basis, H. Lotze can be included in the paradigm of subjectivism regarding the formation of values, since it is the subject who is capable of experiencing feelings of satisfaction or dissatisfaction. In this case, the “criterion of values” is real human experiences, the spiritual world of the subject.

From this perspective, regarding the concept of “value”, H. Lotze thinks pragmatically, since he believes that the concept of “value” should be combined with pleasure, that is, a thing “... would be of supreme worth which caused satisfaction to an ideal mind in its normal condition...

and the idea of an object possessing worth, which is altogether unconditioned, which does not show its worth by its capacity to produce pleasure, shoots beyond the mark” [4, p. 690]. But such pleasure or pain is not, from the point of view of H. Lotze, concretely objective, since he speaks of “pleasure and pain in general” [4, p. 695], that is, as criteria for attributing to value. In addition, the philosopher believes that “...we are constrained by the inherent worth of things” [4, p. 695]. In other words, in the system of views of H. Lotze, the concept of “value” is formed not based on an axiomatic-discursive justification of higher values, but based on their practical meaning for a person in the context of the criteria of satisfaction – pain, which are more reliable axiological criteria than formal moral and axiological considerations. The latter, from the point of view of H. Lotze, is based on the idea of “supreme principle” [4, p. 696]. Hence, in the considerations of H. Lotze, the secularization of moral principles is traced, because reliable moral principles are derived by him not from the idea of “supreme principles” [4, p. 696], but from a more specific criterion – “pleasure / pain” [4, p. 695], which are more closely related to the subjective sensuality of a person and their corporeality. Hence, the secularization of moral principles in H. Lotze has a pragmatic and hedonistic content.

The views of H. Lotze are characterized by the connection of value with sensory data, that is, values and moral judgments are connected with sensuality. He believes that aesthetic and moral judgments change “...from accompanying sensations in which that which is of intrinsic worth appears to us as harmonizing with the innermost conditions of our own individual existence” [5, p. 38]. Hence, values have a subjective origin, since they are based on sensory perception and corporeality, in particular on pleasure and pain, which indicates elements of phenomenological axiology in the work of H. Lotze.

In general, H. Lotze considers pleasure-pain as a criteria of value. In his opinion, pleasure and pain are fundamental causes and motives of actions [4, p. 683]. If pleasure and pain are fundamental reasons and grounds for actions, then accordingly, the philosopher tends to the secularization of all processes in this case, which are based on human activity, including cognition and evaluation of reality. In such regard, he puts great emphasis on feelings, particularly pleasure and pain as factors of moral and axiological processes. On this basis, he expresses himself in the context of sensualism regarding the fact that “...not only does the whole current of intelligent life commence with the sensations, but to these it incessantly returns in order to find materials and starting point for new developments of its activity” [4, p. 563]. In this regard, it is the subjective sensory perception based on pleasure/pain in the system of H. Lotze’s axiological views that is the source of spiritual life, and accordingly, all its spheres, including values, which indicates elements of phenomenological axiology in his views. The philosopher believes that “each sensation is an element of feeling which measures in terms of pain and pleasure the value of the stimulation received for our individual existence” [4, p. 567]. In this aspect, H. Lotze thinks similarly to I. Kant, who believes that “The Pleasant, the Beautiful, and the Good, designate then, three different relations of representations to the feeling of pleasure and pain, about which we distinguish from each other objects or methods of representing them. And the expressions corresponding to each, by which we mark our complacency in them, are not the same. That which gratifies a man is called pleasant; that which merely pleases him is beautiful; that which is esteemed... i.e. that to which he accords an objective worth, is good” [2, pp. 53–54]. On this basis, I. Kant’s axiological priorities are formed based on aesthetic representations and are associated with the criteria of pleasure and pain, which are the basis of the aesthetic ability to judge [2]. I. Kant believes that a “merely subjective (aesthetical) judging of the object, or of the representation by which it is given, precedes the pleasure in it, and is the ground of this pleasure in the harmony of the cognitive faculties...” [2, p. 65].

H. Lotze speaks of the axiological inclination of a person to evaluate all phenomena in the context of their value or non-value, and the criterion for such an assessment is the feeling of pleasure – pain. That is, a person has a tendency to compare certain contents of sensations based on sensory contemplation, and therefore a person is characterized by the systematicity of mental sensations. At the same time, “the sensation itself, appears in consciousness, so do the feelings rise within us without revealing the internal motion of the soul whence they spring. But once there they must be accounted for as we have done, and unsophisticated consciousness never doubts that pleasure has its roots in some unknown favoring influence that has been shed on our life, pain in some disturbance of it” [4, p. 241].

H. Lotze believes that there is an “evaluative faculty of the soul” based on the feeling of pleasure and pain” [4, p. 305]. In his opinion, if we, for example, distinguish between external and internal events, then “whatever proceeds from pleasure or pain appears to us as a reaction of our whole nature” [4, p. 687]. That is, human reactions in the form of pleasure and pain are holistic reactions of a human to external factors and are based on the unity of body and soul. According to H. Lotze, “...whatever stimulations, then, the soul may undergo, from each one we must expect an impression of pain or pleasure...”[4, p. 243]. He believes that “To each simple sensation, each colour, each tone, corresponds originally a special degree of pain or pleasure” [4, p. 243]. According to H. Lotze, “...feeling further contains the principle of that peculiar and highest activity which we encountered in the sphere of intelligence, namely, of that reason which requires of the actual sum of things conformity with forms of existence in which alone it finds a guarantee of the value of the actual” [4, p. 244]. He notes that “...in its feeling for the value of things and their relations, our reason possesses as genuine a revelation as, in the principles of logical investigation, it has an indispensable instrument of experience” [4, p. 245]. H. Lotze believes that “Like all values given to objects of thought, this too is apprehended only by means of feelings of pain and pleasure” [4, p. 250]. In this sense, feelings of pleasure and pain are axiological criteria of external and internal phenomena, which a human can perceive.

Substantiating the idea of pleasure and pain as the main motives of moral and axiological action and as basic criteria of the constitution of values, the philosopher grounds these considerations on the idea of the unity of body and soul. H. Lotze expresses the idea of the unity of the sensory and spiritual factors. On this basis, a criticism of materialism is possible, which H. Lotze applies in his views. According to H. Lotze, in the context of the idea of the pervading animation of the universe [4, p. 361] regarding the relationship between the soul and the body “two different beings do not here face one another, but that the soul as an indivisible being and the body as a combined plurality, form kindred and homogeneous terms of this relation” [4, p. 364]. In this perspective, in the philosophy of H. Lotze, pleasure and pain as criteria for values are related to the idea of the unity of body and soul, which the philosopher defends. He believes that “The more deeply conscious the soul is of itself and its destiny, the more obnoxious to its self-esteem is the direct unity presented by the combination of the inner life with the marvelous material organism, the soul being inevitably forced to sympathize intensively, by pain and pleasure, with all the excitations of the body...” [5, pp. 65–66]. It is the idea of the unity of soul and body that is the basis for the fact that pleasure and pain become criteria for values. In this aspect, subjectivism in the approach to values in H. Lotze based on sensual pleasure/pain is based on the idea of the direct unity of soul and body. The idea of the direct unity of soul and body also has elements of secularization, since the soul and body become important for human existence, in particular, from the point of view of the philosopher, they “are close in nature” [4, p. 364].

From the point of view of H. Lotze, the criterion of attraction to good is pleasure, which is also one of the criteria of value, because value and pleasure are connected through good since

things are valuable to the extent that they participate in the realization of good [4; 5]. On this basis, according to H. Lotze, the world as such is impossible without man, because man is a unique being who, by his very existence, tries to multiply good and enjoy it, which makes man valuable, because by imitating good, man imitates God, who is at the same time being, good and the personal basis of being [4; 5]. From this point of view, H. Lotze emphasizes the value of man, since he has a connection with the primary basis of the world, he is involved in God, and therefore is valuable, that is, in this aspect, H. Lotze lays the foundations of the paradigm of personalism, within which man is value.

Hermann Lotze's ideas regarding pleasure and pain as the criteria of values found their response in the axiology of Max Scheler, which is also based on the criticism of formal ethics and the formal axiology of I. Kant. In Max Scheler the foundation of the material ethics of values is based on feelings of pleasure, which also indicates his ethical hedonism [8]. In this aspect, the axiology of Hermann Lotze [4; 5], and Max Scheler [6] is not formal, but rather phenomenological, because pleasure and pain are the feelings that are included in the structure of the human psyche.

Conclusions. Pleasure and pain in the axiology of Hermann Lotze are important motives of actions and the criteria of the constitution of values. On this basis, subjective states of a human in the form of feelings are to some extent also the criteria, which are correlated with objective values. Hence, pleasure and pain are not only subjective phenomena but due to the unity of body and soul and the unity of a human as a microcosmos and existence, are also the parameters of comprehension of good and benefit as objective values. On these grounds, the axiological ideas of Hermann Lotze are relevant also for modern discourse regarding the nature of various personal identifications, since they propose reliable practical criteria for verification of such theories and concepts, systems of values and truth because pleasure and pain are those criteria, which are equally perceived by people regardless of their ideological or religious worldview. Pleasure and pain propose such an axiological model of human activity, which is not mere hedonism, but is the concept of common sense, whereas whatever various identifications or theories were theorized within human culture, they can still be verified on the subject of truthfulness from the point of view of pleasure and pain as sensory criteria.

Axiological ideas of Hermann Lotze regarding pleasure and pain as criteria of values, and in general, his thoughts regarding the emotional states influence human motivation and the understanding by a human of what really is true, beautiful, good, important, and useful is an alternative to formal axiology and various theoretical ways of searching for the new categorical imperative. It is exactly the feelings of pleasure and pain that can be reliable criteria for searching individual and collective values, therefore they are reliable practical criteria of comprehension of moral and axiological reality, regardless of whatever ideologies, religions, theories, ideas, or identifications a human lived in, either in present time or in the future.

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ЗАДОВОЛЕННЯ ТА БІЛЬ ЯК КРИТЕРІЇ КОНСТИТУЮВАННЯ ЦІННОСТЕЙ В АКСІОЛОГІЧНИХ ПОГЛЯДАХ Г. ЛОТЦЕ

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У статті розглядаються аксіологічні погляди Германа Лотце крізь призму аналізу почуттів задоволення та болю. У філософських поглядах Германа Лотце простежується важлива роль задоволення і болю як критеріїв конституювання цінностей. Задоволення і біль можна вважати тими аксіологічними параметрами, які протистоять, наприклад, формальній аксіології І. Канта, яка не має чіткого практичного критерію цінностей та опирається тільки на категоричний імператив та водночас вимагає активного почуття обов'язку, а також віри у свободу волі, Бога та безсмертя душі, які є основними мотивами моральної та аксіологічної поведінки та відповідно підтримують почуття обов'язку. На противагу до Імануїла Канта саме через задоволення і біль Герман Лотце намагається подолати межі між ідеалізмом та емпіризмом, висловлюючи ідею єдності духу і тіла, та критикує на цій основі матеріалізм та позитивізм, які є односторонніми у питаннях природи людини та її душі. У поглядах Германа Лотце задоволення і біль це не просто суб'єктивні переживання людини, але надійні практичні аксіологічні критерії, які є фундаментальними засадами формування цінностей. Крім того, задоволення і біль відчуються всіма людьми незалежно від їх ідеологічних, релігійних, філософських та інших розмаїтих ідентифікацій, а тому можуть бути емпіричними критеріями перевірки цінностей та верифікації розмаїтих моральних та аксіологічних теорій на їх істинність. Саме через динаміку почуттів задоволення і болю Герман Лотце зумів поєднати сферу індивідуального суб'єктивного людського досвіду та об'єктивну природу цінностей. Задоволення і біль виражають гармонію або дисгармонію душі і тіла та людини і космосу та вказують на природу загального блага, істини і краси. На основі афективних переживань задоволення та болю Герман Лотце критикує формальну аксіологію Імануїла Канта та створює елементи гедоністичного підходу до розуміння природи цінностей, який потім простежується в аксіології Макса Шелера, який також розвиває свою аксіологію на рівні почуттів. На цій основі емоційні переживання людини, зокрема задоволення і біль, можуть розглядатися як критерії верифікації моральних та аксіологічних теорій у сучасних філософських дискусіях.

Ключові слова: задоволення, біль, формальна аксіологія, гедонізм, прагматизм, єдність духу і тіла, секуляризація, феноменологічна аксіологія.